
Story in the Public Square 11/15/2026: Rory Cormac
Season 20 Episode 18 | 27m 25sVideo has Closed Captions
"Fakers: A Top Secret Tale of Phantoms and Forgeries on the Disinformation Front Line”
This week on Story in the Public Square, we sit down with international relations scholar Rory Cormac to discuss his fascinating new book. The work stems from a trove of previously classified documents unearthed by the university professor, exposing the web of front organizations, fabrications, and forgeries used at the peak of the Cold War. Join us for a compelling conversation.
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Story in the Public Square is a local public television program presented by Ocean State Media

Story in the Public Square 11/15/2026: Rory Cormac
Season 20 Episode 18 | 27m 25sVideo has Closed Captions
This week on Story in the Public Square, we sit down with international relations scholar Rory Cormac to discuss his fascinating new book. The work stems from a trove of previously classified documents unearthed by the university professor, exposing the web of front organizations, fabrications, and forgeries used at the peak of the Cold War. Join us for a compelling conversation.
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Learn Moreabout PBS online sponsorship- In the mid 20th century, strategists developed the idea of cold war as an alternative to hot war between nuclear-armed superpowers.
Today's guest unearthed a trove of previously classified documents, revealing the role of forgeries, front organizations, and fabrications at the height of that conflict.
He's Rory Cormac, this week on "Story in the Public Square."
(gentle music) Hello and welcome to "Story in the Public Square" where storytelling meets public affairs.
I'm Jim Ludes from the Pell Center at Salve Regina University.
And my guest this week is a scholar of intelligence and covert operations.
Rory Cormac is a professor of international relations at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom.
He's also the author of a new book, "Fakers: A Top-Secret Tale of Phantoms and Forgeries on the Disinformation Frontline."
He's joining us today from Nottingham.
Rory, thank you so much for being with us, and congratulations on the book.
- Thanks very much.
Pleasure to be here.
- I mentioned to you before we got started that this is a rip-roaring, incredible read.
And you know at the opening of the book that it's based on 8,000 files that were released by the British government.
How did you come into possession of them?
- They just dumped them at the National Archives, to be perfectly honest.
There's no great detective story.
It was at the height of COVID and all of a sudden they just released in two or three big batches of thousands of files.
And I, you know, started to go through them and realized this is absolute gold dust.
And I'm relatively experienced at researching, you know, secret history, and I kind of know what's kept back and what's not.
Even I was staggered at the level of detail, the people, the operations, the gossip, the snide comments and the margins.
It was just glorious.
It's a historian's dream.
- Well, so as someone who spent a little time in archives too, the level of detail that you found in these documents sort of belies any sort of redactive process that we might otherwise expect.
Were you surprised by just how forthcoming these documents were?
And did somebody make a mistake?
I think is the question I wanna ask.
- I don't think they did.
I think the reason they kind of gave is that, "This is in the past.
We don't do this kind of thing anymore.
It's within the year rule," or whatever it is.
But even so, I was genuinely gobsmacked.
I mean, we're used to the top level minutes, you know, the presidential memoranda, the prime minister's cabinet committee, this kind of thing.
That's what we're used to as historians.
You don't get the operational nitty gritty, the planning it, the details, the personalities, the characters.
And that's what I really enjoyed writing about in the book, was being able to tell the stories about these characters.
And it's all from the files.
You know, you had people having conversations across different minutes, and it was personal.
It was full of color.
I mean, it's that level of, you know, characterization of detail that I'd never, ever seen before in my career as a historian.
- Well, so, you know, I think we probably ought to bring everybody up to speed because you and I, you wrote the book, I've read the book.
Let's give folks a quick overview.
What is the book actually about?
- The book is about a top secret British campaign at the height of the Cold War about countering Russian disinformation and subversion, that sort of thing.
It follows the story of an eccentric bunch of men and women who worked in a attic in the annex of the British foreign office.
And their job essentially was to come up with fakes and forgeries in order to counter and expose Russian activities.
And it's a Cold War story, but it's also one that is quite timeless and quite reminiscent of today because at its heart, it's a story about, well, how does a state, a democracy expose and disrupt subversive activities whilst doing so in a credible manner and in a way which doesn't undermine one's own democratic values?
So this particular team, they, and without blowing intelligent sources either.
So were stories basically about this team who wanted to expose Soviet fronts, fakes, forgeries, disinformation, all the kind of things that viewers are familiar with today, but they couldn't blow their intelligent sources.
They couldn't say MI6 has told us that.
Because in those days, MI6 didn't officially exist.
So therefore, they had to come up with clever, sneaky means to get this material into the public domain.
And they did it through a whole, you know, range of things, going from fake groups all the way through to forgeries.
- Yeah, so we're gonna talk about some of those front organizations that they employed.
But let's talk a little bit about forgeries.
So when we're talking about that, these are not somebody somewhere creating fake currency of another country.
What are we talking about with forgeries?
- They would essentially forge Soviet front organization material.
So they'd get hold of letterheads, of signatures, that sort of thing.
They would get hold of the correct types of paper, types of staple.
I mean, this is the wonderfully kind of John Le Carre-esque detail that we have in the files and subsequent in the book.
You got, you know, the MI6 staples guy.
And they also wanna work out the exact font of a typewriter, for example.
And what they do, they'd gather all that information.
They would work out what their message was going to be, what they wanted to expose.
And the trick was to try and do it in a way which only ever used genuine Soviet statements and language, because that made it really difficult for the Soviets to expose it as a forgery.
So they, for example, wanted to expose the treatment of students inside the Soviet Union or of Islam inside the Soviet Union, and they would deliberately take genuine Soviet documents, which were not intended for certain audiences and they would cobble them together, take things out of context, a little bit of spin maybe, but it was genuine words, stitch them together, put them on a letterhead from the World Peace Council or something.
And then they would post these forgeries to student groups around the world or Islamic groups around the world to try to expose the Soviet treatments of whichever group it may be.
- Yeah, so it's a fascinating level of detail, to put it mildly.
One of the things that you point out is that a number of the key drivers here sort of emerge from the experience of the Second World War and the experience of running disinformation and influence campaigns in the course of that conflict.
Talk to us a little bit about that legacy.
What do they learn in the war that they then bring into the Cold War that affects the way they operate?
- It's the same people.
The same people were hired in the Second World War and they stayed on long into the Cold War.
So you've got this generational legacy until the mid 1970s, of the same men and women doing the same kinds of tactics.
And these things include how to... The thing that struck me actually most was it wasn't just about how to change people's views and minds, the way we think about propaganda.
One of the things they learned from the Second World War was that actually the aim can be to undermine confidence in the leaders, for example, to try to induce some paranoia.
So it wasn't necessarily about, say, trying to get the German masses to turn against Hitler or to choose democracy over communism.
It was, that might be kind of too grand.
One of the lessons they learned was, okay, well, even if it gets intercepted by the Nazi and subsequently the Communist intelligence services, they're going to be worried about a leak.
It might tie their intelligence services down in a mole hunt.
It might add extra bureaucratic friction or whatever it might be.
So there was this lesson really of we don't necessarily need to change everyone's hearts and minds and views.
It's enough to work out who the key players are and try to pull certain levers at the right time and the right order to have a more targeted approach.
The problem was in the Second World War, it was obviously total war and the team was relatively well resourced and also included a lot of refugees from Nazi Germany and Central Europe who knew the language, knew the culture inside out and could be credible when they're doing their propaganda.
The Cold War by contrast was a global war and most of these activities targeted the Soviets and the Chinese in Sub-Saharan Africa, in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
And so the British just did not have anywhere near the same level of local knowledge and subject matter expertise.
- I found that to be a fascinating detail, as did the sheer number of front organizations that we encounter just in the pages of your book, just a couple, the World Council of Peace, the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Committee for the Investigation of Communist Front Organizations.
And those are a list from both sides of the East-West divide.
Why were the powers, why were the superpowers, why were the great powers so invested in front organizations as a useful tool in the Cold War?
- The Soviets were using it for deniability purposes.
It was a way of trying to influence the student movement, international journalism, in a way that looked like it was independent and autonomous, but was actually being, puppeteered is too strong a word, but was being, you know, subtly influenced and directed and funded in a certain direction from Moscow.
And then the British ones that we discuss in the book are an attempt to try and expose those Soviet front organizations.
So one of the ones you mentioned there was the International Committee for the Investigation of Soviet Organizations, whatever it's called, a very catchy, (Jim laughing) a very catchy name.
And that was, you know, that never existed.
That was a fake research institute, existed only on paper, and it deliberately wrote very dry academic analysis of Soviet front organizations, what we might today call doxing, where they would expose financial details and Soviet officers who were, you know, involved in some of these things.
And then they would send copies of this institute's papers to journalists around the world to try and expose what the Soviets were up to.
- It's wild.
You know, so one of the tried and true techniques that you document in the book is something called information laundering.
And I wonder if you could just walk the audience through what that is and maybe with a good example.
- Yeah, this is the classic challenge that the state had back in those days when the intelligence services did not officially exist.
You know, we couldn't, we couldn't, as the US does now and the UK does now.
And we saw it before the Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 when they came out and said, CIA and British intelligence have this information that Russia's going to do X. And that was based on classified intelligence and they put it into the public domain to try and shape a particular view or advance a particular policy.
Now, in the Cold War, the UK in particular could not do this because MI6, GCHQ didn't officially exist.
And also, they had the problem of blowing intelligent sources.
So the kind of information laundromat whirled into gear when MI6 would pick up a piece of intelligence that, for example, there'd been a some sort of disagreement, some sort of friction amongst delegates at some Communist-sponsored youth festival or something like that.
MI6 would then pass it to the propagandists.
The propagandist would check if they're allowed to use it.
And then they would basically launder it through a forgery, a fake group, a fake covertly controlled news agency, whatever it may be, to get that bit of intelligence out into the public.
And then once it's out in the public, they hope that genuine news organizations will then cover it and it'll get picked up and, you know, go viral, in today's terms.
And there were numerous examples of them successfully doing that.
- We're talking about what you refer to, the others we would refer to as black propaganda, stuff that governments don't wanna have their names associated with.
You wrote, and I'm quoting here, "Black propaganda existed on a global scale far larger than historians realize."
I wonder if you could speak to that piece.
You're an accomplished historian of covert operations and intelligence and, you know, reading the book and listening to some of the other interviews you've done, you're as I think surprised as the rest of us about the extent to which this was.
And I wondered to myself, is this the propagandist's last hurrah that they fooled us for so long that these things actually existed to the extent that they did?
- I was genuinely surprised.
And it might be my own, you know, Western-centric bias around some of these sorts of things.
And the way the subject's been covered historically has been very particularly US-centered and what the CIA were up to and to a lesser extent the UK.
And so I came into it thinking, right, the CIA was doing a lot of propaganda operations.
The Russians were doing a lot of propaganda operations.
The Brits were doing a bit, you know, a long way behind, but we had a sizable program.
That Brits program was more sizable than I realized.
But I didn't realize, and this is my own bias, I think, in the issue of sources, that actually the Kenyans were at it, the Ghanaians were at it, the Tanzanians were at it, the Egyptians were at it.
And so, you know, I wrote this book.
It is a history of the British campaign, but the Brits were one actor amongst many.
And I'll give you one quick example.
I was lucky enough to have a research assistant working in the Kenyan archives and Britain was targeting Kenya with a lot of fake groups to try to undermine one of its senior politicians.
And so we went through the Kenyan archives, looking to see how the Kenyan government reacted to this, recognized it, picked up on it.
And they did, and they were concerned about it.
But they were more concerned about propaganda coming from Somalia.
And the arrogant Brit in me, I was quite surprised.
(Jim laughing) I don't think about Somalian as a propaganda nation.
But that really did strike me, how, and I think we need to remember it as historians, is how all of these states, and this wasn't a superpower battlefield, if you like.
All of these states had their own agency and were doing their own influence operations to a degree which I did not realize.
Now, that's not to create false equivalence between what the Somalis were doing and what the CIA was doing.
Of course, it was very, very wildly different scale and legal presence and all that, all the rest of it.
But they all had their, they were all doing their own things.
- Well, you know, I wonder, you know, so the period that you cover really begins around 1960, and I think you wrote someplace that had a lot to do with the fact of just where the documents began.
But there was, there was a program in place of there were activities running from the end of the war up through that era.
But this coincides with the period of decolonization and the immediate aftermath of that.
And I wonder from a broader historical perspective, if you can reflect a little bit on the impact of decolonization on these kinds of campaigns and how that sort of played into British policy making at the highest levels.
- It was so, so important.
You know, the Cold War historians have, you know, recognized for a good few years now wasn't just about Berlin and Europe.
And it was completely intertwined with decolonization and all sorts of things going on across the entire globe.
And we see in the British case, most of its black propaganda operations, and indeed most of its most aggressive or assertive covert campaigns, shall we say, are not targeting Russia.
Sometimes it's too risky, too hard.
Not really targeting much of Europe.
They're targeting countries in the Global South.
They're targeting particularly parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, because the UK obviously was retreating and there was a bit of a power vacuum.
And so one of the purposes, not just of propaganda, but of political influence and the rest of the tools which states have in their arsenal was about trying to maintain British influence at a time when Britain didn't have the political capacity and the military capacity and was in retreat.
Now what's interesting is you see a lot of other states trying to move in and gain influence in this post-imperial space.
So you have the UK, the CIA.
The US is also trying to move in and increase its influence in some of this space.
So we interestingly see our two countries competing as well as cooperating.
The Russians, obviously.
China becomes a big player trying to increase its influence in the post-imperial space.
And of course, regional actors and local actors are becoming more powerful as well.
So it really is this big mix of Cold War and decolonization.
And sometimes British propaganda got it terribly wrong and would ascribe far, far too much influence to Russia or China and blame them for nationalist maneuverings when, you know, it was an internal matter.
So they often got it wrong.
It was complicated.
- That's not just a British thing.
The Americans did a lot of that too.
You know, one of the things that struck me was that there was an enormous amount of effort that went into discrediting somebody like Egyptian President Nasser.
And, you know, ultimately I found myself wondering, well, just how effective, at the end of the day, were these kinds of tactics?
- This is the million dollar question, and they couldn't answer it.
And we still struggle to answer it now as historians, because there was a nice line in one of the files where they were lamenting the fact they can't prove their worth.
They said that propaganda is like fertilizer.
You sprinkle it on, but you can't prove how much difference it actually makes to the crops, because a good propaganda campaign plays into existing schisms, plays into existing debates, it pushes along existing narratives and uses existing actors.
So it's really, really difficult to isolate the agency.
And so for the decades after the Cold War, these propagandists who've been doing it for a very long time was saying, "Look, we can't prove it, but trust us.
We targeted politician X, and that politician was removed from power a month later," or whatever.
And that was kind of okay until the early 1970s when you can see a change in managerial culture where spreadsheets and metrics become much more pervasive as combined with, the British government is obviously in decline and is a bit broke, to put it mildly.
And so these lines no longer hold up.
And the government comes back and says, well, prove it.
Prove that your propaganda operation led to this particular outcome.
And they just couldn't do it.
And that ultimately was one of the downfalls of the department and the team, this inability to prove their worth.
- So of the operations that you researched for this book, was there one that made you just go, oh wow?
- Yes.
(Jim laughing) There were two, if we being fair, but I'll pick out the one that really does stick with me, was Indonesia in the mid 1960s, which is a very dark time in Indonesian history and in Cold War history, where there was a failed coup against the Indonesian leader, which generated tragic events of mass killings of leftists and Chinese people.
And against this darkness, the British government came up with a bizarre plan to try and encourage some of this violence, which is a very serious, serious thing to have done.
And the plan was bizarre.
It came from the ambassador, and he said, "Can we not pretend to be the ghosts of the murdered generals who were killed at the start of this failed coup plot?
I mean, could pretend that we're rising up and trying to expose the role of certain coup plotters and claim that we're gonna have our vengeance?"
So while these tragic events are unfolding, you've got these characters back home who are scrambling around looking for an echo machine to make it sound as scary as possible.
Eventually that was a bit too much even for the propagandist and they tried to call it off, but by that point it was too late.
The ambassador, fancying himself as a bit of a James Bond, had personally dropped copies of audio tapes in plant pots in hotels around Jakarta.
And I think they ended up being played in kind of covert broadcasting stations by the Malaysians.
And that struck me because it was, one, a completely bizarre operation.
And two, it showed this light and shade.
It showed the kind of almost fast and ridiculousness of some of the operations as they're taking place against very, very serious international events.
So yeah, that one definitely stuck with me.
The ghosts from the well.
- You know, you also wind up with some really personal histories of a lot of these players, which is not the kind of thing that I have usually typically found in the archival research that I've done.
You incorporate a lot of that into the book as well.
And I'm wondering, when you're done with a project like that, do you feel like you know the people and does it give you some insight into what they brought to this profession?
- Very much so.
I do feel, I do feel like I know them or at least know a certain version of them.
And it all comes from their comments.
I mean, the comments are quite personal on their memos to each other.
It's quite conversational.
And you really get a sense of these people, you know, their colloquialisms.
They're telling each other off.
And there were some quite eccentric characters, because one of the fascinating things about this department is that it was technically part of the foreign office, but because it was quasi-separate, they didn't have the same restrictions when it came to who they could recruit.
So they recruited, you know, a whole range of people, from journalists to refugee writers to artists, quite pioneering with the recruitment of women in very senior leadership positions, who couldn't have got a job in the regular foreign office because of the, you know, sexist practices.
And I was able, just purely through the files, to tell their story and to tell their fallings out, their rivalries.
And that was new for me as a historian.
I've never been able to do that before, and I really quite enjoyed it.
- Rory, we've got literally about 60 seconds left here, but I'm wondering, does this history shed any light on the kind of contemporary influence and information campaigns that we see all the time emerging, whether it's from the Russians or the Chinese or elsewhere?
- I think it totally does.
I think the AI and modern technology has increased the speed, it has increased the scale, it has increased the scope of all of this kind of thing.
It's amplified it massively.
But the fundamental principles and challenges and trade-offs, for me, are exactly the same now as they were in the 1960s, as they were in the 1600s with the invention of the printing press.
The aims that people have, you know, is it about persuasion?
Is it about undermining paranoia?
The-trade offs around when do we expose, when don't we expose, what is disinformation?
They're timeless.
- Rory Cormac, the book is "Fakers."
It is a rip-roaring good read.
Thank you for being with us this week.
But that is all the time we have.
If you wanna know more about "Story in the Public Square," you can find us on social media or visit salve.edu/pellcenter, where you can always catch up on previous episodes.
And I wanna thank you too for sharing some of your week with me.
I'm Jim Ludes, asking you to join me again next time for more "Story in the Public Square."
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